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Corruption: Measuring the Unmeasurable 
 
Abstract:  While  the  strategy  of  measuring  and  quantifying  has  been  extremely 
successful, and valuable in the progress of science, it does not follow that it is universally 
useful. We argue that attempts to measure corruption can be counterproductive in several 
different ways. Qualitative and action oriented approaches may prove more valuable. A 
political  economy  explanation  of  why  extremely  distorted  and  biased  measures  of 
corruption continue to be used is also offered. 
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1. The Quantitative Imperative 
 
During WW I, Florence Nightingale experienced the benefits of fresh air and light for her patients in 
Turkey. Later, as advisor to the India Office, she issued orders that all windows in Indian hospitals 
should be kept open at all times. Substantial outcry and political influence was required to reverse 
this order, which was extremely inadvisable due to Indian heat.  
 
Developments in measurement have been so crucial to the advance of physical sciences 
that Lord Kelvin was led to proclaim that when you cannot measure, you do not really 
know what you are talking about, and when you can, you do.  The history of this idea of 
the central importance of measurement, sometimes called the “quantitative imperative,” 
has been ably traced by Michell (2003). Despite the impressive benefits to science from 
measurement, it does not follow that all things can be, or should be, measured. Nor does 
it follow that the tactic of attempting to measure and quantify all concepts is necessarily 
useful in advancing research.  
   3 
For example, consider the following scenario, a pastiche on reality in Vietnam: the 
“Quantitative Approach” to winning the Vietnam War in two years
1. 
1.  Count the enemy, and divide by 24 (months in two years). This is the target T. 
2.  Count the number of enemy killed per month, and the resources required per kill. 
3.  Requisition enough resources (soldiers & arms) to make kills per month equal T. 
4.  Forecast the end of war in two years. 
This was the approach adopted by US Defence Secretary McNamara, based on his 
business experience and Harvard MBA. There was great emphasis on measurement, and 
sometime more casualties were incurred in the process of counting the enemy killed than 
during the actual engagement. McNamara ignored more experienced soldiers, who 
suggested that this was not a conventional war, and gave “qualitative” advice along the 
following lines: 
 
The guerrillas rely on local population for recruitment and support. To win the war, we must win the 
support of the local population, which would deprive the guerrillas of their base of operations. Thus 
our focus must be on winning the hearts of the local population. 
 
The first strategy, which appears scientific and quantitative, was tried and found wanting. 
Implementation of the second strategy would require more of a focus on qualitative 
methods, using provision of support, security, justice, as a means to a non-quantitative 
end.  
The point here is not to debate the merits of alternative strategies in Vietnam, but 
to note that the quantitative approach actually prevented McNamara from focusing on 
elements which may have been central to the issue. There are many other situations 
where attempts to measure the immeasurable can lead to errors of various types. A great 
deal of controversy has been generated by recent studies (Elert(2006)) showing that the   4 
correlation of SAT with long run success in college is only between 1% to 4%. The 
enormous amount of effort and expense associated with administering and preparations 
for the test do not seem justified in view of the meagre gains. Psychological studies show 
that the less measurable characteristics of commitment, motivation, and interest correlate 
much more strongly with academic success. The problem is an attempt to measure 
something which is not quantifiable – intelligence, motivation, determination, etc. The 
parable of the man searching for his keys under the light, when he dropped them 
elsewhere, seems to be apt.  
 
In this article, our goal is to show that currently popular strategies for measuring 
corruption do not serve any useful purpose. We also suggest alternatives on how to avoid 
measurements, and also what can and should be measured. 
 
2. Can Corruption be Measured? 
 
It is not difficult to see that “corruption” cannot be measured. The term is too broad and 
vague. Let us restrict the meaning of “corruption” to “bribes paid to government 
officials” which is a common interpretation. With this very specialized interpretation, it 
would be possible in theory to measure the quantity of bribes. There are still two 
dimensions to measuring this quantity: the number of bribes and the size or volume of the 
bribes. For example, it is well known and easily documented that corporations in USA 
hire influential politicians or generals (or relatives) at fat consultant fees, and end up 
winning enormous government contracts. The volume of a small number of such 
transactions is greater than the total estimated volume of bribes for many LDC’s ranked   5 
as highly corrupt. Thus the volume measure would rank the USA as more corrupt, while 
the number of transactions measure would reverse this ranking. Separate consideration of 
just two dimensions of corruption makes it impossible to arrive at an unambiguous 
ranking there are so many dimensions to corruption that it would be hopelessly imprecise 
and ambiguous to give a one number summary of the whole. 
 
  Upto the early twentieth century, a lot of people used to die of “consumption.” 
This was a label given to a cluster of diseases which the doctors could not correctly 
diagnose and identify. Progress in medicine led to correct classification of many of the 
diseases previously tagged as “consumption.” Cures became possible only after a correct 
diagnosis. To try to measure “corruption,” without having a clear idea as to exactly what 
corruption is, is merely an illustration of a confused thought process, and a desire to 
imitate science without having an understanding of what science is about. For example, 
we need to distinguish ‘bribery,’ which takes place with mutual consent, from ‘extortion’ 
which does not; and ‘petty’ corruption (typically between citizens and government) and 
‘grand’ corruption, often involving heads of states and governments, multinational 
corporations, big business, and top officials. Such distinctions make a tremendous 
difference in ranking of countries for “corruption.” Conventional measures, focusing on 
petty corruption would rank Nigeria and Bangladesh as more “corrupt” than USA. If we 
focus on corrupt commercial behaviour, then the trillion dollar Savings and Loan bailout 
in the 1980’s, the spectacular Enron failure, and the recent failure of Mortgage market 
would put USA far ahead
2.
  From the fact that the general term “corruption” is too broad and vague to 
measure meaningfully via one number, we come to two conclusions. Existing measures   6 
of “corruption” must be examined carefully to assess exactly what it is that they are 
measuring (if anything). Also, we may be able to devise better targeted measures of 
corruption when the purpose of measuring corruption is made clearer. For example, as we 
discuss at length, most popular measures of “corruption” actually measure the perception 
of corruption by businessmen. This measure is only relevant to certain very specific 
projects and should definitely not be taken as a general measure of overall corruption.  
 
3. Two Rules for Measurement. 
 
In order to avoid the problems of the the type discussed above, we propose two rules for 
constructing useful and valid measures of special types of corruption. The motivation for 
these rules has already been presented above. Below we will discuss how these rules 
apply as a critique of existing measures and as a guideline for construction of new 
measures. 
 
Rule 1: The target of a proposed measure must be, in principle, measurable.  
 
That is, if we have complete information about an economy, we should be able to name a 
number which is the correct measure of whatever it is that we are trying to measure. For 
example, “corruption” does not qualify, since even if we have complete detail of all 
economic and non-economic transactions in an economy, we would not be able to say 
what number should be used as a measure of corruption. However, we could ask (for 
example) about the amount of money received by officials in the income tax office from 
taxpayers over and above their salaries, and any official payments due to them. This is 
clearly measurable in theory, and therefore a legitimate target to attempt to measure.  
   7 
Rule 2: The goal (or goals) of measurement must be specified. 
 
This is essential since the value of a method of measurement can only be assessed in 
relation to how well or poorly it achieves desired goals. How much inaccuracy can be 
tolerated, what kind of proxy measurements can be used, and many other issues can only 
be decided in relation to the goal for which the measurement is being done. This will be 
clarified in connection with examples to be given shortly.    
 
As a simple and illuminating example based on an actual case in Pakistan, the 
government was interested in eliminating smuggling of certain types of goods. It 
calculated the total cost of bringing in smuggled goods, which included bribes to police 
and customs officials. Then it set the official tariff rate at a level which was about equal 
to this cost, so that the incentive to smuggle was eliminated. The goal (elimination of 
smuggling) dictates what has to be measured (bribery costs and transport cost 
differentials for smuggling routes versus normal routes for imports) as well as the 
accuracy required for the measurement (to accurately set matching tariff rates). 
 
As a second example, one may be interested in measuring nominal revenue loss due to 
bribery in customs (or in income tax).  This would be useful as a guide to how much 
money can be invested in fighting corruption in these departments, as these numbers 
would provide an upper bound on the maximum saving which could be realized by 
eliminating corruption. In particular, assessing the value of privatization, of salary 
incentives to reduce corruption, of tax farming, and other measures to combat corruption 
would depend on an accurate gauge of these numbers. This illustrates our general   8 
principle that focussed measures of corruption for specific objectives may be useful, 
while general overall measures are not. 
 
 
4. A Critique of the CPI 
 
One widely used measure of corruption is  CPI (Corruption Perception Index), produced 
by Transparency International. We will show how it violates our proposed rules and is 
consequently not helpful. Similar criticisms apply to all general measures of corruption, 
and we utilize the CPI only as an example here. 
 
4.1: Perceptions Differ from Reality 
 
  To say the Tranparency International produces measures of corruption is simply 
wrong. TI does not measure corruption, and to label the measures produced by TI as 
measures of corruption is highly misleading. We could more accurately label TI measures 
as averages of perceptions of businessmen regarding corruption in various countries. 
Once this is clear, than TI rankings would not attract headlines such as “Bangladesh: the 
most corrupt country in the world.” Rather, it could be said that Bangladesh is perceived 
to be most corrupt by a certain group of businessmen. The meaning changes dramatically 
with this rephrasing. Many studies show systematic biases in perceptions from many 
sources. For example, surveys showed that the majority of the USA public believed that 
Al-Qaeda was in Iraq, and that Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks on WTC.  Stiglitz 
and Bilmes At a time when statistics showed that the homicide rate in Washington DC 
was four times that of Karachi (a violent city), the public perception based on newspaper 
reports was dramatically different
3.    9 
 
 4.2: Who is the Perceiver? 
 
 
Again, there is the issue in perceptions of who is doing the perceiving. One might 
consider the TI rating to be useful for businessmen planning to invest in a foreign country 
– perceptions of businessmen regarding corruption may be considered relevant to this. 
Then of course, the measure should be renamed as a measure of extra-legal payments 
needed for FDI in the target country, since that is what it is trying to capture. Once the 
goal is clear, then we could considerably sharpen our measures, since now we know what 
the purpose of measurement is. We could look at all obstacles to FDI in chosen country, 
legal and governance, and assess the role of corruption within this context, where it 
would make a lot more sense. As our proposed second rule suggests, the goal of 
measurement sheds a lot of light on what needs to measured and how. As a concrete 
illustration of “obstacles to FDI”, consider the problems that Muslim investors face in the 
US. The threat of arbitrary and illegal seizure (as in the case of Iranian assets) as well as 
cancellation of signed contracts (as in the Dubai Port World, certain Muslim Charities, 
endowments and chairs at US Universities, and many other cases ) would clearly classify 
in the same category as corruption. On this basis, rankings could be done and would 
produce meaningful numbers on risks of doing business. The point is that once the goal is 
specified, then exactly what aspects of corruption need to be measured, and how they 
relate to the overall picture, becomes much clearer. 
 
Another reason to consider carefully “who is doing the perceiving” is made clear by the 
CPI itself. While the construction of the CPI from a collection of indices is shrouded in 
mystery (leading to complaints of “Non-Transparency” of Transparency International),   10 
enough details are available to suggest that the indices depend heavily on perception of 
wealthy businessmen. The types of corruption that this class experiences, as well as the 
journals/newspapers that inform them, is substantially different from what the local 
populace would experience or read. Accordingly, the CPI would differ systematically 
from corruption perceptions of local populace (which might be a more accurate measure 
of corruption). This is documented in the Hungarian Pilot Project by Gallup, which 
shows that there is a methodological difference between the measurement of petty 
corruption and white-collar corruption in the higher spheres of state or business 
administration.  Similarly, as pointed out by Sik (1999), the “expert” evaluations of the 
group of international businessmen utilized in the TI surveys are severely biased. This is 
because this group is (a) fairly closed (the cross-validity of separate experts. evaluations 
are not the consequence of their similar reflection of the same truth, much more the 
common stereotypes, developed on social events they jointly attend, or other sources of 
personal networking),( b) the group is not accustomed to the local customs and language 
(they do not know how issues are settled locally and tend to use bribery to solve problems 
fast), and (c) they are businessman.  
 
4.3 What is being measured? 
 
 There is a 98% correlation between the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by 
Transparency International and log(GNP per capita) run on all the countries of the world 
for which data is available for 2005!  The log was taken simply because CPI is bounded 
between 1 and 10 while GNP per capita is not similarly bounded. This creates substantial 
confusion about exactly what CPI measures. On the surface, it seems that businessmen 
perceptions of corruption are almost completely based on wealth. Given that there is only   11 
2% additional variation over log(GNP per capita) it does not seem credible that the CPI 
measures “corruption” in any significant sense. 
 
4.4 Why is it being measured? 
 
  A credible answer to this question is provided in the final section of this paper. 
For the moment let us take on faith the standard answer, namely that measurement of 
corruption is a means of combating corruption. If this is the goal, then there are several 
reasons why perception based measures would be especially harmful.  
 
  It is well established that perceptions are strongly influenced by factors having 
little to do with underlying realities. People give excess weight to personal experiences, 
so that people with relatives who have died of cancer will assign unduly high 
probabilities to cancer in the general population. Perceptions are strongly influenced by 
media, with resultant obvious biases. Thus, the US public generally believed that Iraq 
possessed WMD, and the purpose of the Iraq War was to bring democracy to Iraq, while 
European public believed that the war was about control of oil resources. The media 
portrayals are influenced by spectacular events and also by politics, so that fluctuations of 
media based opinions are likely to be much greater than those in the underlying reality of 
corruption.  
 
  Two aspects of perception based measures are even more disturbing when taken 
in context of combating corruption. Given influence of media and personal experiences in 
forming perceptions, a government which wanted to lower its corruption perception 
ranking would be well-advised to hire Madison Avenue experts, and invite foreign   12 
businessmen on special tours etc. These propaganda measures would be much more 
effective in changing perceptions of corruption than serious efforts to combat corruption. 
A second aspect is the demonstration effect – publicizing corruption tends to lead people 
to emulate it, once they see that it appears to be common and go unpunished. Perceptions 
about corruption may substantially influence the level of corruption and it may increase 
the level of corruption in a economy. For example, Cabelkova (2000) finds that high 
corruption perceptions make people believe that they have to pay bribes, and make the 
officials think that there is nothing wrong with accepting them. Thus, publicly available 
measures of corruption perception may actually contribute to the problem. 
 
5. The Variable Yardstick 
 
  From the 98% correlation between log (GNP per capita) and “Corruption” as 
measured by CPI in 2005, one would conclude that “corruption” is another name for 
“poverty” while “honesty” is another name for “wealth”. While other measures and other 
periods of time may not yield as high a correlation, there is no doubt that nearly all 
measures show low corruption in Europe and USA, and high corruption in the poorer 
countries, and hence a strong correlation between wealth and honesty. Is it really true that 
corruption declines as countries become richer
4, or is this an artefact of the methods of 
measurement chosen? We pause to consider this crucial question in greater detail. 
 
  It is acknowledged by both proponents and opponents that concern with 
governance and corruption emerged in the early 90’s in response to the realization of 
widespread failure of World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs to achieve significant   13 
progress in development. The breakdown of the “Washington Consensus” on the route to 
development was also a consequence of this failure. World Bank sympathizers  like 
Santos (2001)  argue that this was a learning process, where failure led to examination of 
the causes of failure. Opponents, like Susan George(2008) or Hardstaff and Jones(2006) , 
argue that neo-colonialist policies being pursued by the IFI’s are not meant for 
development; rather these policies transfer of huge amount of resources from the poorer 
to the richer nations causing vast amounts of misery, hunger and deaths. Governance and 
corruption provide a convenient cover and an excuse for failure of policies not designed 
for development in the first place. Support for this second point of view is provided by 
Chang (2000) and Abed and Davoodi (2000) who show that conventional factors are 
better are explaining growth, and the “invisibles” of governance and corruption fail to 
explain differential outcomes in growth. The professional literature toes the hegemonic 
line, and the second point of view is vastly under represented. For this reason, we present 
a more detailed exposition of this latter view below. 
 
Before WW1, when Britannia ruled the waves, sea power and other criteria more 
aligned with British hegemony were used to judge world dominance. Destruction of 
European economies in the War led to the undisputed leadership of USA, and the 
matching yardstick of GNP per capita. Later, when certain sparsely populated Middle 
Eastern oil based economies overtook USA in GNP per capita, it was realized that in 
addition to wealth, an even income distribution is also an essential prerequisite for 
leadership in the world. When Sweden, Switzerland, and certain other European 
economies overtook USA in GNP per capita, and had better income distributions, it was   14 
realized that infrastructure (roads, dams, etc. which are substantially greater in USA 
relative to Europe) was also required for leadership
5. The point is that the powerful get to 
make the rules on what criteria are appropriate to measure power, wealth, leadership, etc.    
 
   Prior to WW1, European imperialism was justified on purely racist grounds. For 
example, Cecil Rhodes said; "I contend that we (the British) are the finest race in the 
world; and that the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race." 
Sentiments like Macaulay’s “(none) could deny that a single shelf of a good European 
library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia” were common among 
European intellectuals. The racist assumption of European superiority was accepted as 
being just as factual as the law of gravity, or the revolution of the Earth around the Sun. 
A sophisticated intellectual analysis of this phenomenon is available in “Orientalism” by 
Edward Said. For our purposes, it is enough to note that this philosophy provided the 
moral backbone for the otherwise sordid historical processes of imperialism and 
colonialism. Cecil Rhodes became the richest man on Earth, and England the richest 
country on Earth, while carrying the White Man’s burden of bringing civilization to the 
rest of the world.    
 
   While racism is outmoded and no longer politically correct, the imperatives of 
imperialism and neo-colonialism continue to drive world politics. As before, it is 
necessary to have a moral cloak to cover baser motives. The imperialist imperatives 
require us to say that it is bad for Iraq to invade Kuwait for securing its oil, but it is good 
for the USA to invade Iraq for the same purpose. Similarly, USA and European   15 
adventures all over the world, sometimes under the cover of law (of the WTO, for 
example) or sometimes without, require some moral justification. Today the buzzwords 
of “governance” and “corruption” function as the substitute for the racism of the past. 
The dictator Saddam provided extremely poor and corrupt governance to his people, 
justifying the US invasion
6. The ‘infinite justice’ available in US gives it the moral right 
to kidnap heads of state like General Noriega, Aristides, Saddam for their corrupt 
activities and bring them to trial
7. All over the world, trade and domestic policies 
favourable to multinationals are dictated to the poor and powerless countries – the better 
governance and low corruption of the rich and powerful countries gives them a moral 
right to advise and compel the lesser races to perform according to the higher standards
8.  
 
  Do rich countries have a right to claim the mantle of moral superiority on the 
basis of better governance and lesser corruption? To many this claim seems as factual as 
the bombing of Hiroshima in WW2, just as idea of superiority of the white race was 
considered factual in the last century. Consideration of a few facts should serve to dispel 
this illusion. It is well known that Bush lied to the public and generated misleading CIA 
reports about WMD in Iraq (as well as Iraqi involvement in 9/11) to motivate the public 
and the Congress to start the war. As documented by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), a 
conservative estimate of the cost is three trillion dollars and five trillion is a more realistic 
estimate.  This misuse of public office and betrayal of public trust is perhaps the single 
most massive corrupt transaction in the history of mankind. The combined monetary 
value of all petty bureaucratic corruption in the poorer countries pales in comparison.  
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To dispel the idea that this is the exception which proves the rule, we report the outcome 
some recent polls conducted  in wake of several corruption scandals involving US 
Congressmen
9. In a USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted April 28-30, 2006, 83% of the 
population considered corruption in Congress to be a very serious or somewhat serious 
problem.    Similarly, in  Pew Research Center for the People & the Press survey 
conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Feb. 1-5, 2006, 81% 
of the public considered that bribing and corruption are common in Congress. Similarly, 
in wake of scandals and court cases about “vote stealing’ by Bush, public opinion polls 
show that more than 80% of US public distrusts the voting process, especially the 
electronic voting machines currently in common use (see  
http://www.acm.org/usacm/weblog/index.php?p=73 )  In view of this evidence, can we 
conclude that the world leaders are qualitatively different from the primitive and 
underdeveloped (these pejoratives being synonymous with low income) countries? 
6. Conclusions 
 
Several qualifications are necessary to ensure that our message is understood. 
Corruption is a multidimensional phenomenon and no one number can measure it 
adequately. If it is suitably specialized to a particular aspect, it can be measured and 
countries ranked. If we consider corruption in petty bureaucracy, there is no doubt that 
there are fewer corrupt transactions in rich countries where the bureaucrats receive hefty 
salaries. Small private sectors and large, underpaid bureaucracies in poor countries lead 
to substantially greater exposure of general public to corrupt transactions. However, there 
are many more dimensions to corruption, and by changing the focus and definitions   17 
suitably, it would be easy to establish that richer countries are more corrupt. It is the 
powerful who decide which dimensions should be considered in constructing a measure 
of corruption and governance. If, instead of the number of corrupt transactions, we focus 
on ‘volume’ and ‘impact’ it is likely that the correlation between income and corruption 
would be reversed. This is because the rich require heftier bribes, and the stakes and 
resulting losses are much higher. When rich multinational drug companies “lobby” to 
protect patent rights, deaths in poorer countries result from lack of availability of generic 
equivalents. When agricultural lobbies protect subsidies against WTO rules in EU and 
USA, African farmers starve
10.  Millions die in wars conducted for naked pursuit of 
power or profits for the rich countries. There is no parallel among the more corrupt 
poorer countries to killing a half million children
11, or the burning of millions of Jews, for 
political purposes. 
   
  It is in the interest of the powerful to focus on those dimensions which make them 
appear better, as it provides a moral justification for their otherwise unjustifiable actions. 
This does not mean that poor countries (with low GNP per capita) should not try to 
eliminate corruption or improve governance – both of these steps are important and 
necessary. However, spurious quantitative calculations do not prove the moral superiority 
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